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An Equal Protection Analysis of Restrictive 
Abortion Laws: Affirmative Steps to Protect 
Women's Liberty 
by Beth Morrow* 
Introduction 
This Note is a response to the United States Supreme Court's 
continuing erosion of the fundamental right to privacy, which was held 
in Roe v. Wadel to encompass a woman's decision to terminate her 
pregnancy. Roe v. Wade focused solely on the fourteenth amendment's 
due process clause2 as the source of the abortion right. This Note will 
argue that this important right should also be grounded in the fourteenth 
amendment's equal protection clause.3 
Part I sets out an equal protection argument for abortion rights that 
both follows the Supreme Court's established line of analysis and 
probes some of the trends indicated in its adjudication of equal 
protection questions. Part II then sets out an equal protection argument 
for the right to choose that takes equal protection one step further than 
the Supreme Court has yet done, in an appropriate direction given the 
goals of our Constitution and of equal protection in particular. Finally, 
Part III discusses the advantages these equal protection arguments bring 
to abortion rights and to women's rights in general. 
* 
I. 
Restrictive Abortion Laws Should be Invalidated as 
Violative of the Equal Protection Clause. 
A. Equal protection, generally, protects individuals from discrimi-
nation that is based on their membership in a disadvantaged 
group. 
B.A. (Russian and East European Studies) Yale University, 1986; Class of 1991, 
University of California, Hastings College of the Law. 
1. 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (holding limited by Webster v. Reproductive Health Svcs., 109 
S.Ct. 3040 (1989». 
2. 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973). 
3. The abortion right should be articulated as evolving from a number of constitutional 
protections, including privacy, equal protection, and freedom of religion. However, this 
paper will only discuss the equal protection clause as a basis for the right. 
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The goals underlying the equal protection clause of the fourteenth 
amendment involve various permutations on a central theme: the 
Constitution aims to restrain state lawmakers from imposing any laws 
on their people that have the effect of making one group inferior to 
another. Laws-~ restrict women' ~ access to aOOnkm have ~tly tll3l 
impact on women; they place women in an inferior position to men 
within this society. The fourteenth amendment provides, in relevant 
part, that "[n]o state shall ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction 
the equal protection of the laws.,,4 Such equal protection applies to the 
federal government as well as to states through the due process clause of 
the fifth amendment 5 
The fourteenth amendment was enacted in an effort to validate the 
Civil Rights Act of 1866. Therefore, its purpose was to promote a 
position of equal citizenship for emancipated slaves and Black 
Americans, specifically through an extension of the fundamental rights 
to contract and to purchase property.6 The equal protection clause, 
according to the Court of 1879, has a broad goal of removing "legal 
discriminations [which have the effect of] implying inferiority in civil 
society .... "7 The fourteenth amendment was initially enacted to 
address only race discrimination, but the Court quickly conceded that it 
had a broader scope: "We do not say that no one else but the negro can 
share in this protection . " [I]f other rights are assailed by the states 
which properly and necessarily fall within the protection of these 
articles, that protection will apply, though the party interested may not 
be of African descent."8 
Equal protection today requires ,courts to examine laws with varying 
levels of scrutiny, depending on the degree to which their subject matter 
implicates possible discriminatory intent. The Court has expanded the 
umbrella of equal protection beyond race discrimination, designating 
both alienage and national origin as "suspect classifications.'>9 Suspect 
classifications are those that are based on factors "so seldom relevant to 
the achievement of any legitimate state interest that laws grounded in 
such considerations are deemed to reflect prejudice and antipathy ... 
[and therefore] are subjected to strict scrutiny .... "10 Strict scrutiny 
4 . U.S. CaNST. amend. XIV, § l. 
5. Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497,500 (1954). 
6. See R. BERGER, FEDERAUSM: THE FOUNDER'S DESIGN 158-63 (1987). 
7. Strauder v. W. Va., 100 U.S. 303, 308 (1879) (law denying blacks the right to be 
jurors held to violate equal protection). 
8. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 72 (1873). 
9. See, e.g., Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971); Oyama v. Cal., 332 
U.S. 633, 644-46 (1948). 
10. Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985). 
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requires that only the most compelling interests will justify state 
interference with fundamental rights, and only where such interference 
is narrowly tailored to serve those interests. 11 
R Restrictive abortion laws fail at a heighteIred lev€! m-8GIlltiny. 
Gender has not been designated as a suspect classification. 
However, the Court has set out an intermediate level of scrutiny which 
requires that "classifications by gender must serve important 
governmental objectives and must be substantially related to the 
achievement of those objectives."12 The Court first applied equal 
protection to prevent sex discrimination in the 1971 case of Reed v. 
Reed.13 In that case, a state law was struck down because its objective, 
administrative convenience, was not considered sufficiently important to 
justify a gender-based classification. I4 Reed established that 
classifications on the basis of gender would be treated less deferentially 
by reviewing courts, but the Court did not explain why or how this 
would be accomplished in the wider application of equal protection 
law. IS 
The Court has used the intermediate level of scrutiny to probe the 
actual impact of a policy as compared to the state's articulated goals. If 
the means chosen do not serve the ends sought by a law, the 
classification may have resulted from "the mechanical application of 
traditional, often inaccurate, assumptions about the proper roles of men 
and women."16 In Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan, the 
Court found that the school's single-sex admissions policy did not serve 
the stated goal of educational affinnative action. 17 The Court found that: 
11. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 109 S.Ct. 706, 721 (1989). A strong 
argument can be made, as was done in Roe v. Wade, that restrictive abortion laws tread on 
a woman's fundamental rights. (410 U.S. 113 (1973) (fundamental right to privacy». A 
woman's right to control her own body can also be read as a fundamental right stemming 
from the liberty guarantees of the due process clause: "Liberty means more than freedom 
from servitude, and the constitutional guarantee [of due process] is an assurance that the 
citizen shall be protected in the right to use [her] powers of mind or body in any lawful 
calling." Smith v. Texas, 233 U.S. 630, 636 (1914). Strict scrutiny is applied both to 
laws that create suspect classifications and laws that tread on fundamental rights. New 
Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976). This Note will not explore the "fundamental 
rights" line of inquiry. 
12. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976). 
13. 404 U.S. 71 (1971). 
14. ld. at 76-77. 
15. Law, Rethinking Sex and The Constitution, 132 U. PENN L. REV. 955, 975 (1984). 
16. Miss. University for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 726 (1982). 
17.ld. at 727. 
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"Rather than compensate for discriminatory barriers faced by women, 
MUW's policy of excluding males from admission to the School of 
Nursing tends to perpetuate the stereotyped view of nursing as an 
exclusively woman's job."18 As a result, the Court would not defer to 
the state's choice of means to serve a permissible end. 
The intermediate level of scrutiny, as applied to discrimination on 
the basis of gender, has become more rigorous than was indicated in 
Reed v. Reed. 19 In Mississippi University for Women,20 Justice 
O'Connor wrote for the majority that a party seeking to uphold a statute 
that classifies individuals on the basis of their gender carries "the burden 
of showing an 'exceedingly persuasive justification' for the 
classification".21 O'Connor's opinion explains that this "burden is met 
only by showing at least that the classification serves 'important 
governmental objectives and that the discriminatory means employed' 
are 'substantially related to the achievement of those objectives' . "22 Use 
of the modifier "at least" suggests that the Court seeks more than the 
justifications required by its intermediate level of scrutiny.23 In 
Mississippi University for Women, the Court showed a willingness to 
reconsider whether classifications based upon gender are inherently 
suspect, but did not reach this question, finding the statute invalid at the 
established standard of scrutiny.24 
In applying an intermediate level of scrutiny to restrictive abortion 
laws, the Court should find such laws invalid because they do not serve 
their purported objectives. Restrictive abortion laws do not advance the 
interests asserted by states in their defense - those being the protection 
of potential life and, occasionally, the promotion of maternal health. 
Historically, statutes making abortion illegal did not end abortion but 
sent women underground to obtain their abortions illegally.2s So, 
neither was the potential life of the fetus saved, nor was the health of the 
mother promoted. Restrictive abortion laws have one certain effect: 
they render the options available to women exclusively dependent on 
18. Id. at 729. 
19.404 U.S. 71 (1971). 
20. Miss. University for Women, 458 U.S. at 729. 
21. Id. at 724 (quoting Kirchberg v. Feenstra, 450 U.S. 455, 461 (1981». 
22.Id. at 724 (quoting Wengler v. Druggists Mutual Ins. Co., 446 U.S. 142, 150 
(1980» (emphasis added). 
23.Id. 
24. Id. at 724 n.9. 
25. See generally, I. MOHR, ABORTION IN AMERICA: THE ORIGINS AND EVOLUTION OF 
NATIONAL POLICY 254 (1978) (citing Alfred Kinsey Report, Medical Abortion Practices in 
the United States, in ABORTION AND THE LAW 37-38 (D. Smith ed. 1967». 
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their financial status - a legislative goal which would be impennissible 
if articulated. 
C. The Supreme Court should apply a strict scrutiny standard to 
laws which classify on the basis of gender and, specifically, to 
restrictive abortion laws. 
Though restrictive abortion laws could be struck down at an 
intennediate level of scrutiny, it is more appropriate to analyze them 
under a strict scrutiny standard. Although the Court has not yet held 
gender to be a suspect classification, it came very close to doing so in 
Frontiero v. Richardson26 in which a plurality ruled that sex-based 
classifications should be regarded as constitutionally suspect.27 There, 
Justice Brennan wrote for the plurality: "[W]e can only conclude that 
classifications based upon sex, like classifications based upon race, 
alienage, or national origin, are inherently suspect, and must therefore 
be subjected to strict judicial scrutiny."28 The strict scrutiny aspect of 
this plurality opinion, however, did not hold up through time.29 
The originalist argument30 that classifications on the basis of gender 
were not intended for strict scrutiny has been weakened by the Court's 
expansion of the equal protection doctrine to ethnicity and alienage.31 
From an originalist perspective, there is no greater support for defining 
these categories as suspect than there is for finding gender suspect. 
Gender too is a congenital and basically unalterable trait; it has been 
used as a basis for discrimination throughout the history of this 
country.32 Women have long been seen as persons whose "paramount 
destiny and mission . . . [is] to fulfil the noble and benign offices of 
wife and mother.'>33 Restrictive abortion laws have as their premise this 
limited view of womanhood. 
26. 411 U.S. 677 (1973). 
27. [d. at 682. 
28. [d. at 688. 
29. This is best illustrated by the Court's return to the Reed v. Reed (404 U.S. 71 
(1971» level of scrutiny in later significant cases like Craig v. Boren (429 U.S. 190, 197-
200 (1976». 
30. As Raoul Berger defmes his perspective, speaking from what is here referred to as 
the originalist position: "[Ilt is established learning that what the Constitution meant 
when it left the hands of the Founders it means today." R. BERGER, supra note 6, at 18-19. 
31. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971). 
32. See Brest, Affirmative Action and the Constitution: Three Theories, 72 IOWA L. 
REV. 281, 284 (1987). 
33. Bradwell v. Ill., 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130, 141 (1872) (Bradley, J., concurring) 
(upholding law denying women the ability to practice law in Illinois). 
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The goals underlying the expansion of equal protection to ethnicity 
and alienage apply readily to gender. In Yick Wo v. Hopkins,34 the 
fourteenth amendment was found to apply to a class of people not 
originally considered to deserve protection: "[T]he very idea that one 
man may be ~~ t6-tiolG his life~ er tOO~of li¥ing, ... at the 
mere will of another, seems to be intolerable in any country where 
freedom prevails as being the essence of slavery itself."35 This same 
clear goal presents a basis upon which the Court should apply strict 
scrutiny to restrictive abortion laws and find them "intolerable ... as 
being the essence of slavery."36 Ironically, a woman's lack of 
reproductive self-determination stands in direct contrast to the high value 
individual liberty enjoys in American society.J7 
"[W]hile physical love enervates man, as being his favorite 
recreation, he will endeavor to enslave woman -- and, who can 
tell how many generations may be necessary to give vigor to the 
virtue and talents of the freed posterity of abject slaves?" 
Mary Wollstonecraft, 1792 38 
D. Under a strict scrutiny standard of review, restrictive abortion 
laws are invalid. 
1. Restrictive abortion laws classify on the basis of gender. 
Restrictive abortion laws classify on the basis of sex; the burden of 
abortion restrictions falls exclusively on women. As Chief Justice 
Rehnquist noted in Michael M. v. Superior Courf39: "[V]irtually all of 
the significant harmful and inescapably identifiable consequences of 
34. 118 u.s. 356, 370 (1885). 
35. Id. at 370. 
36.Id. 
37. The importance of John Locke's theories in the development of American 
democracy underscores this point. In his influential TREATISE OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT of 
1689 (C. Sherman ed. 1937), he wrote that while government is necessary, the liberty of 
the citizen should be its most important goal. Id. Similarly, theories as to the importance 
of autonomy in the development of a healthy psyche inform an understanding of the 
American personality. See E. ERICKSON, CHILDHOOD AND SOCIETY 254 (1963) ("[T]he 
sense of autonomy fostered in the child and modified as life progresses, serves (and is 
served by) the preservation in economic and political life of a sense of justice."). Note 
also that, as Professor Robin West points out, this focus on freedom and individuality 
presents a very masculine framework, but one on which our jurisprudential structure is 
defmed. West, Jurisprudence arul Geruler, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1988). 
38. M. WOLLSTONECRAFT, A Vindication of the Rights of Woman, in A MAR Y 
WOLLSTONECRAFT READER 322 (B. Solomon & P. Berggren eds. 1983). 
39. 450 U.S. 464 (1981). 
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teenage pregnancy fall on the young female .... "40 There, the Court 
observed that teenage boys do not bear any of these same 
"consequences."41 It follows, then, that any restrictions on choices 
regarding pregnancy affect only those upon whom their burdens fall: 
"young females" and adHlt women. 
Discrimination on the basis of pregnancy constitutes discrimination 
on the basis of gender. However, in Geduldig v. Aiello,42 the Court 
attempted to define pregnancy as a gender-neutral phenomenon and 
upheld a California disability insurance program that denied coverage 
for work loss resulting from pregnancy. The Court found that the law 
did not "discriminate against any definable group or class," since there 
was a "lack of identity between the excluded disability and gender."43 
But, the Court's resolution of this issue in Geduldig had many flaws44 
and the Court has since stepped back from its early position. In 
Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty,45 City of Los Angeles v. Manhart,46 and 
Arizona Governing Committee v. Norris,47 the Court recognized that 
discrimination on the basis of pregnancy might be linked to sex 
discrimination.48 
Moreover, the classification created in restrictive abortion laws 
includes virtually all women: adult women who might some day get 
pregnant and girls who will some day become women.49 All might 
40. /d. at 473. 
41. Id. 
42. 417 U.S. 484 (1974). 
43. Id. at 496 n.20. 
44. In Geduldig, the Court found no classification on the basis of gender. It did, 
however, find that the law established two classes: "pregnant women and nonpregnant 
persons." 417 U.S. at 496 n.20. But, the characteristic "nonpregnant" is simply not 
applicable to men, since men are incapable of becoming "pregnant". Logicians would 
classify the application of "nonpregnant" to men as a vacuous quantifier, devoid of real 
meaning. Professor Tribe called this reference "the 'pregnant persons' fantasy," 
entertained by the never-to-be-pregnant men on the Supreme Court. L. TRIBE, 
CONSTITIITIONAL CHOICES 239 (1985). 
45. 434 U.S. 136, 138-43 (1977). 
46.435 U.S. 702, 716-17 (1978). 
47. 463 U.S. 1073, 1084 n.14 (1983). 
48. The evolution of the Court's opinion is credited, in part, to Congress, which passed 
a law establishing that discrimination on the basis of sex includes discrimination on the 
basis of pregnancy: The Pregnancy Discrimination Act, Pub. L. No. 95-555, § 1, 92 Stat. 
2076 (1978) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1981)). 
49. Since the Court has held that the choice whether or not to go through with a 
pregnancy is not a man's choice to make, it is only a woman's choice that is limited by 
restrictive abortion laws. See Planned Parenthood of Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 
71 (1976). A law that limits women's access to abortion is limiting the choices available 
to women without affecting the choices open to men. Some men may choose to share the 
burden imposed by a woman's inability to terminate her pregnancy due to the absence of a 
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potentially be faced with an unwanted pregnancy and thus have a stake 
in the existence or absence of choice. 
2. The dissimilar situation of men and women as regards 
pregnafiCy does not provide a state a compelling interest in the 
dissimilar treatment of restrictive abortion laws. 
When a court begins its analysis of a law which creates a 
classification on the basis of gender, Reed directs the court to examine 
whether the law commands dissimilar treatment for men and women 
who are similarly situated; and, if so, whether that dissimilar treatment 
is a result of an arbitrary legislative choice. 50 This question of similar 
situation opens the equal protection analysis under the strict scrutiny 
standard, as well. The state has a credible interest in treating two 
groups differently only when the two groups are in dissimilar 
situations. 51 
Men and women are similarly situated in that they both have some 
measure of control of their reproductive capacities, but for the laws 
which deprive only women of that controI,52 Abortion has existed since 
time immemorial as one birth control technique in a spectrum of 
techniques. Some birth control methods were and are controlled by 
men; abortion was and is a method controlled by women. 53 Abortions 
were effected or attempted by means ranging from homeopathic potions 
and strenuous exercise to medical procedures performed by a midwife 
or doctor. 54 Men and women are differently situated in this process of 
reproductive control only because the methods they use are different. 
And, more recently, a difference in situation was created when laws 
were imposed that restrict women's access to the safest, most effective 
choice. Arguably, those men too are affected by restrictive abortion laws. But, men can 
easily abdicate their responsibility for child-rearing; and, men never have, nor can they 
choose, the responsibility for child-bearing. 
50.404 U.S. 71, 76-77 (1971). 
51. [d. at 75. 
52. "If people have been treated differently in society they will appear in dissimilar 
positions when they are compared. Therefore, they cannot be similarly situated for 
purposes of equal protection review." Wildman, The Legitimation of Sex Discrimination: 
A Critical Response to Supreme Court Jurisprudence, 63 OR. L. REV. 265, 268 (1984). 
53. See R. PETCHESKY, ABORTION AND WOMAN'S CHOICE 27-34 (1984). 
54. See J. MOHR, supra note 25, at 3-19. 
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type of reproductive control (besides sterilization), the therapeutic 
abortion. 55 
this is how to make a good medicine for a cold; this is how to 
make a good medicine to throwaway a child before it even 
becomes a Child; this is how to catch a fish ... 
Jamaica Kincaid, Gir156 
A finding of a dissimilar situation between men and women should 
not end an inquiry into whether a law violates the principles of equal 
protection. A model of law which does not allow for difference in its 
definition of equality will never view men and women as equals.57 
3. The political process is inadequate to protect women's right to 
choice. 
Since every U.S. legislature up to this point in time has had a male 
majority, usually by quite an extreme margin, 58 the political process has 
proved inadequate in protecting women's right to choice. Male 
majorities in state legislatures have passed restrictive abortion laws that 
do not affect themselves. In the past, the Court has given strict scrutiny 
to cases in which legislative action clearly reflects only the interests of 
the parties in power.59 The Court has even invalidated laws on the 
ground that the legislature could not be relied upon to rectify an 
inequality that it imposed.60 
55. The existence of this one guaranteed form of control has been a particularly 
important option for those women who are unable to control the act of intercourse in 
situations in which men take over that control. Abortion puts women on a similar footing 
with men in the realm of reproductive control. 
56.1. KINCAID, Girl, in AT THE BOTTOM OF THE RIVER 5 (1985). 
57. The model that views women as differently situated than men in the area of 
pregnancy is preferable to one that emphasizes their similarity, though similar situation 
makes for an easier equal protection argument. See C. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: 
DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND LAW 32-45 (1987). The analytical problem arises from the fact 
that the normative model for the law is the male; it does not arise from the lack of 
similarity in men's and women's situations. This bias is evident in the language used to 
frame the dissimilarity: "only women can become pregnant," rather than: men do not have 
the ability to get pregnant. See e.g., Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 496 n.20 (1974). 
58. Women comprised 5% of the members of Congress and 16.9% of state legislators in 
1989. 2 FuND FOR THE FEMINIST MAJORITY, The Feminist Majority Report 2,5 (July 
1989). 
59. See J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 152-53 
(1980). 
60. See Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960) (state legislature enacted an 
unconstitutional redistricting plan which deprived blacks of their right to vote). 
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Male legislatures do not pass laws which would impose a burden on 
themselves similar to the burden placed on women by restrictive 
abortion laws. Specifically, legislatures rarely pass Good Samaritan 
Laws, which impose criminal liability on any person who knows that a 
crime is being commit~ which exposes another to bodily harm and 
who fails to summon help or provide assistance. 61 Given that only 
women get pregnant, abortion restrictions have the effect of compelling 
women, and only women, to be Good Samaritans.62 As Judith Jarvis 
Thompson so aptly framed the dilemma before Roe: "[There is a] gross 
injustice in the existing state of the law" that compels women alone to be 
Good Samaritans to the unborn fetus inside themselves, compelled by 
their "nature" or their biology, not by support for Good Samaritan laws 
in the United States.63 
He hoped that he had not made love to the woman, but if he had, 
it really didn't matter. He certainly had not meant to. 
The Real World, 1988 64 
4. A strict scrutiny analysis of state interests places limits on the 
restrictions a state might impose on a woman's ability to obtain 
an abortion. 
The strict scrutiny standard requires that the state's interests 
justifying a law be compelling65 and that the law be narrowly tailored to 
satisfy those interests.66 The majority's analysis of the compelling state 
interests present in abortion restrictions should apply here, in the equal 
protection context. In Roe, the Court found that a state's interest lies in 
"protecting the health of a pregnant woman" as well as in "protecting the 
potentiality of human life".67 The trimester framework was developed 
to clarify what restrictions would satisfy this state's interest. As long as 
abortion poses a smaller risk to a woman's health than does childbirth, a 
61. See State v. Williquette, 129 Wis.2d 239, 261 (1986). 
62. States have begun to enact laws which penalize pregnant women for harm to their 
fetuses -- the clearest example of legislative readiness to enact Good Samaritan laws when 
only women will be affected. See Johnsen, The Creation of Fetal Rights: Conflicts with 
Women's Constitutional Rights to Liberty, Privacy, and Equal Protection, 95 YALE L. J. 
599 (1986). 
63. J. THOMPSON, RIGlITS, RESTITUTION, AND RISK: ESSAYS IN MORAL THEORY 16 (1986). 
64. lUND! BROOKS, THE REAL WORLD 137 (N.Y.: Silhouette - America's Publisher of 
Contemporary Romance, 1988). 
65. Kramer v. Union Free School District, 395 U.S. 621, 627 (1969). 
66. Griswold v. Conn., 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965). 
67. 410 U.S. at 162. 
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state cannot impose an abortion restriction which claims to be narrowly 
tailored to protect its interest in women's health.68 And, until the fetus 
reaches "viability" and might survive unassisted outside the womb, a 
state's interest in protecting potential life is not sufficiently compelling to 
justify abortion restrictions.69 
II. 
An Appropriate Equal Protection Review of Restrictive 
Abortion Laws Would Include an Analysis of State's 
Interests That Goes Beyond a Conventional Analysis. 
In its analysis of restrictive abortion laws, the Supreme Court has 
not adequately scrutinized the states' interests behind such laws. As the 
Court proceeds through a strict scrutiny analysis, it asks whether the 
law in question is suitably tailored to serve a compelling state interest.70 
In the case of abortion, the Court has chosen to construct the trimester 
framework for analyzing a state's interest in regulating abortion.71 In 
such a framework, the state's interests are asserted as being the 
protection of potential life and women's health.72 These two interests 
become "compelling" at different points in a pregnancy.73 Debate over 
the usefulness of the trimester framework continues to this day.74 
However, an important state interest emerges when abortion is analyzed 
as an equal protection issue, one that exists throughout pregnancy and 
that heavily favors preserving abortion rights. 
Since every state is part of a union in which there exists a national, 
constitutional mandate to preserve liberty and promote equality, it 
should be assumed that all state laws are enacted with the preservation 
of liberty and equality as an underlying interest, whether or not such is 
explicitly articulated as a state interest. Therefore, whenever an equal 
protection analysis is necessary because a law threatens to encroach on 
68.Id. at 163. 
69. Id. at 163-164. Note, however, that the holding of Roe has been limited by Webster 
v. Reproductive Health Svcs., 109 S.Ct. 3040 (1989). The Court is wary of this trimester 
framework, which relies so heavily on external achievements of science. ld. at 3055. Part 
II of this Note expands the features of the trimester analysis to include a third state 
interest, thus diffusing the precarious scientific balance between maternal health and fetal 
life. 
70. See Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 375 (1971). 
71. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 163. 
72. !d. at 163-64. 
73.ld. 
74. See, e.g., Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 109 S.Ct. 3040, 3043-3046 
(1989). 
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liberty or to compromise equality, the Court should read into the law a 
state's interest in promoting liberty and equality. Then, when the Court 
analyzes whether a law is carefully tailored to serve a compelling state 
interest, it will invalidate any law that does not serve this implied, 
compelling state interest. 
Therefore, in an analysis of restrictive abortion laws, this implied 
state interest will figure in alongside the states' interests in protecting 
potential life and maternal health. And, since the ability to control her 
body and her reproduction is vital to a woman's liberty, in a society in 
which men enjoy such bodily integrity, the preservation of abortion 
rights serves this state interest in promoting liberty and equality. This 
reading of the equal protection clause requires that a state's interest in 
promoting equality is always compelling and can only be outweighed by 
a more compelling state interest to the contrary. 
This review requires the Court to make a leap that might be seen as 
treading on traditional notions of federalism.75 But, the Court has made 
such a leap before, though it has not made it part of its conventional 
equal protection analysis. In Beal v. Doe,16 and Maher v. Roe,77 "a 
state interest in support of childbirth was manufactured out of whole 
cloth.,,78 The Beal Court took the state's interest in "protecting the 
potentiality of human life,,,79 and rephrased that interest so that it held a 
completely different meaning. The result: "[T]he State has a valid and 
important interest in encouraging childbirth.,,8o Essentially, the Court 
here dictated a state interest that was not mandated by precedent nor 
raised in the parties' briefs. 81 And, the Court has since relied on its 
restatement of the interest to compromise its holding in Roe v. Wade. 82 
75. Traditional deference to both legislative purpose and legislative choice of means 
create a presumption of constitutionality at lower levels of scrutiny. Cleburne v. Cleburne 
Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985). But, the Court has designated some legislative 
motives uncon~titutional. See, e.g., Keyes v. School District No.1, 413 U.S. 189,208 
(1973) (finding "unlawful segregative design" of the legislature). And, the Court also 
flushes out improper motives when it looks at whether a classification fits the goal 
asserted better than any alternate classification would. The process assumes that a 
classification does not serve the stated objective if the legislature's real objective was 
unacceptable and therefore was never made explicit. See J. ELY, supra note 59, at 146. 
76. 432 U.S. 438, 445-46 (1977). 
77. 432 U.S. 464, 478 (1977). 
78. Wildman, supra note 52, at 303. 
79. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 162 (1973). 
80 . Beal, 432 U.S. at 445. 
81. The state interests asserted revolved around the need to control limited public funds. 
Appellant's Opening Brief at 18, Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438 (1977) (No. 75.554); 
Appellant's Opening Brief at 22, Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977) (No. 75-1440). 
82. See Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 109 S.Ct. 3040, 3051 (1989). 
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In Brown v. Board of Education, 83 the Court similarly dictated to 
states an interest that the states did not assert nor wish to assert. In 
Brown, social scientific evidence was introduced to show that 
segregation had a negative impact on black children, and particularly that 
it was harmful to the self-image of those children.84 The adverse 
psychological impact of segregation was found to deny black children 
equal education.85 Much controversy surrounded the use of social 
science data to determine this "legal" issue. Of note here: the Supreme 
Court assumed a state interest in promoting a healthy self-image among 
black children when it emphasized these new scientific findings. The 
states involved did not assert such an interest in defense of their 
segregationist policies. As expressed in Bolling v. Sharpe: 86 
"Segregation in public education is not related to any proper 
governmental objective .... " In Brown, however, the Court went 
beyond an assessment of whether the governmental objectives were 
"proper." It posited a governmental objective -- promoting a positive 
self-image among black children -- and then found that the means 
chosen (segregation) did not serve the implied interest.87 While this 
interest was present at a national level, it was not presented by the states 
as an interest in Brown88and was probably not a recognized objective in 
1954 in the South. Nevertheless, the national interest was of such great 
significance that it could be inferred by the Supreme Court. 
As the Court implied in its analysis of states' interests under equal 
protection in Orr v. Orr,89women may need "special solicitude" of the 
courts to temper past discrimination or particular disadvantage. Such 
"special solicitude" should come in the form of the analysis framed 
above, which imparts an interest in promoting liberty and equality to 
states because past discrimination and disadvantage have encroached on 
the liberty of women and have kept them from attaining a position of 
equality in society. 
83. 347 u.s. 483 (1954). 
84. See Lightfoot, Families as Educators, in SHADES OF BROWN: NEW PERSPECTIVES ON 
SCHOOL DESEGREGATION 5-6 (D. Bell ed. 1980). 
85. Brown, 347 U.S. at 493-94. 
86. 347 U.S. 497, 500 (1954). 
87. Brown, 347 U.S. at 494. 
88.Id. at 486 n.l (arguments by the states centered on their contention that the schools 
were equal, though separate). 
89.440 U.S. 268, 283 (1978). 
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III. 
Equal Protection Provides Numerous Advantages Over 
Privacy as the Basis of a Woman's Right to Choose 
Whether to Terminate Her Pregnancy 
Equal protection language would implicate restrictive abortion laws 
as a form of invidious sex discrimination. Such "discrimination" can be 
accepted, but only when it serves an important or compelling state 
interest, depending on the level of scrutiny applied. With equal 
protection as the basis for abortion rights, abortion is a tool available to 
women in their efforts to overcome sexual and economic domination, as 
individuals and as a group. 
In contrast, the right to privacy is best expressed as the right to be 
left alone.9o With the right to privacy as the basis for legalized abortion, 
women have the right to be left alone in the choices made in their own 
bedrooms and in their doctors' offices. The Court did not take a 
position in Roe v. Wade that validates any choice being made; to the 
contrary, "privacy" forces that choice to be made behind closed doors. 
Consequently, abortion rights have not served to unite women -- neither 
in the struggle to overcome sex discrimination nor in support of one 
another's choices. The language of Roe v. Wade focuses on the act as 
no-longer-crimina1. 91 Under that label, every exercise of that act is 
haunted by the underlying criminality of the act as judged by society'S 
moral standards. 
Catherine MacKinnon discusses the problems with reliance on 
privacy as a fundamental right from which other rights, like abortion, 
ensue: "[I]f inequality is socially pervasive and enforced, equality will 
require intervention, not abdication, to be meaningful. But the right to 
privacy is not thought to require social change."92 The "privacy doctrine 
reaffirms and reinforces ... the public/private split" that has put women 
at a political and social disadvantage for so long.93 And, the privacy 
doctrine ignores the fact that many women's experiences include injuries 
that arise "within and by and because of' the private sphere of their 
lives, rather than because of governmental intrusion into that private 
sphere.94 
90. See Warren & Brandeis, The Right To Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193,205 (1890). In 
this early form, privacy related only to tort law and was not developed as the substantive 
individual right it is today. See Griswold v. Conn., 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
91. Roe, 410 U.S. at 164. 
92. C. MACKINNON, supra note 57, at 100. 
93. Id. at 93. 
94. Id. at 100. 
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Abortion involves the "intensely public question of the 
subordination of women to men ... [and] of the poor to the rich," 
questions that are obfuscated by the categorization of abortion as a 
privacy right. 95 In Roe v. Wade, "women got abortion as a private 
privileg~ not as a public right," which means that only "£w]emen- with 
privileges get rights," in the end.96 The doctrine of abstract personal 
privacy does not allow women to demand public funds for the exercise 
of the abortion right.97 
The main disadvantage of the privacy right, however, is that the 
Supreme Court does not hold it in high regard. It is easier for the Court 
to strip privacy of its substantive guarantees because the right does not 
have a textual basis in the Constitution. Its insecure status is apparent in 
Griswold v. Connecticut,98 in which the Court remarked that "the right 
of privacy which presses for recognition here is a legitimate one. ',1}9 The 
majority in Webster v. Reproductive Health Services loo mentions the 
right to privacy only in passing, belying its insignificance in the minds 
of the Justices. 101 The new majority views Roe v. Wade as having 
established a regulatory scheme, encapsulized in the trimester 
framework, rather than having expanded the components of a 
fundamental right to privacy to include abortion. I02 
Equal protection would inject into the legal dialogue the importance 
of abortion to women's self-determination and the importance of 
women's equality to the legal and political structures of the United 
States. But, equal protection as currently interpreted by the Supreme 
Court does not hold much more promise as the protector of abortion 
rights than does privacy, except that it has a textual foundation in the 
Constitution. Even if strict scrutiny is applied in the equal protection 
inquiry, the Court will still arrive at a point where it employs the 
trimester analysis to answer whether the law is narrowly tailored to 
serve a compelling interest, as it did in Roe. And, without an expanded 
inquiry into states' interests, the answer reached through strict scrutiny 
is likely to be the same. 
The strength of the "interest analysis" explored in Part II of this 
Note l03 is that it combines the liberty strand of Roe v. Wade and the 
95. L. TRIBE, supra note 44, at 243 (emphasis added). 
96. C. MACKINNON, supra note 57, at 100. 
97. See Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297,326 (1980). 
98. 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
99. /d. at 485. 
100. 109 S.Ct. 3040 (1989). 
101. See [d. at 3057. 
102. [d. at 3057-58. 
103. See supra notes 70-89 and accompanying text. 
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equality strand of cases like Mississippi University for Women v. 
Hogan lO4 to arrive at a fortified version of both those constitutional 
doctrines. !Os If the right to an abortion is a due process liberty interest 
(as conceded in Webster),106 or a fundamental privacy interest (as 
establishOO by Roe),107 tlren its backing by a compelling state interest in 
promoting liberty and equality gives legislatures little remaining ground 
upon which to protect the fetus. !Os 
Liberty and equality are both "neutral" principles, basic to the legal 
and political structures of this country. They are widely shared moral 
values, a fact which helps overwhelm apprehension as to their 
application to women's rights in the context of abortion. A state's 
interest in promoting liberty never diminishes through pregnancy. So, 
unlike the narrower trimester analysis of Roe, the "interest analysis" 
does not allow the state's interest in fetal life to gain undue importance 
as the interest in maternal health diminishes. 
The "interest analysis" requires state governments to recognize and 
act in accordance with their role as protectors of liberty and equality .109 
Equal protection seeks to redress disadvantage, and herein lies its 
advantage over privacy. Equal protection takes affirmative steps to 
eliminate discrimination, whereas privacy aims only to leave individuals 
alone in their actions; equal protection works to change the status quo, 
whereas privacy seeks to maintain it. Equal protection invalidates 
restrictive abortion laws as impermissible legal and political efforts to 
relegate women to a subordinate position in society, an effort that has 
persisted throughout the history of this country. 
A model dairy and a hospital up here -- those two things she 
would have liked to do, herself. But how? With all these 
children? When they were older, then perhaps she would have 
time." 
Virginia Woolf, To The LighthousellO 
104. 458 U.S. 718 (1982). 
105. See Lupu, Untangling the Strands of the Fourteenth Amendment, 77 MICH. L. REv. 
981, 983-84 (1979). 
106. 109 S.Ct. at 3058. 
107. 410 U.S. 113, 154 (1973). 
108. See B. SIEGAN, THE SUPREME COURT'S CONSTITUTION 154 (1987). 
109. Reluctance to recognize and enforce a government's role in redressing the 
disadvantages not created by the government is itself a form of "de facto discrimination." 
L. TRIBE, supra note 44, at 1439 n.21 (2d ed. 1988). 
110. V. WOOLF, To TIlE LIGHTHOUSE 89 (1955). 
